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1Abstract
This paper develops a simple model to examine the interaction between part-
ner choice and individual behavior in games of coordination. An important
ingredient of our approach is the way we model partner choice: we suppose
that a player can establish ties with other players by unilaterally investing in
costly pair-wise links. In this context, individual eﬀorts to balance the costs
and beneﬁts of links are shown to lead to a unique equilibrium interaction
architecture. The dynamics of network formation, however, has powerful
eﬀects on individual behavior: if costs of forming links are below a certain
threshold then players coordinate on the risk-dominant action, while if costs
are above this threshold then they coordinate on the eﬃcient action. These
ﬁndings are robust to a variety of modiﬁcations in the link formation process.
For example, it may be posited that, in order for a link to materialize, the
link proposal must be two-sided (i.e. put forward by both agents); or that,
in case of a unilateral proposal, the link may be refused by the other party
(if, say, the latter’s net payoﬀ is negative); or that a pair of agents can play
the game even if connected only through indirect links.
Keywords: networks, links, coordination games, equilibrium selection, risk
dominance, eﬃciency
21 Introduction
In recent years, several authors have examined the role of interaction struc-
ture – diﬀerent terms like network structure, neighborhood inﬂuences, and
peer group pressures, have been used – in explaining a wide range of social
and economic phenomena. This includes work on social learning and adop-
tion of new technologies, evolution of conventions, collective action, labor
markets, and ﬁnancial fragility.1 The research suggests that the structure
of interaction can be decisive in determining the nature of outcomes. This
leads us to examine the reasonableness/robustness of alternative structures
within a model in which the social network is itself an object of study and
co-evolves with the other dimensions of agents’ choice.
More speciﬁcally, in the present paper we apply this approach to the following
problem: the inﬂuence of link formation on individual behavior in games of
coordination.2 There is a group of players, who have the opportunity to
play a 2 × 2coordination game with each other. This game has two pure-
strategy Nash equilibria, one of them Pareto eﬃcient (but risk-dominated)
and the other risk dominant (but ineﬃcient). Two players can only play
with one another if they have ‘link’ between them. These links are made on
individual initiative. They are also costly to form, in the sense that it takes
eﬀort and resources to create and maintain them. A link permits several
interpretations; examples include communication links (with messages sent
from one person to another), investments of time and eﬀort by two persons
in building a common understanding of a research problem, or travel by one
person to the location of another to carry out some joint project.
The link decisions of diﬀerent players deﬁne a network of social interaction.
In addition to the choice of links, each player has to select an action that she
must use in all the games that she engages in. Thus, given the incentives
of individuals to form (or destroy) their links, twin processes of link and
action adjustment unfold that jointly determine the social outcome. We
1See e.g., Allen and Gale (1998), Bala and Goyal (1998), Chwe (2000), Coleman (1966),
Ellison and Fudenberg (1993), Ellison (1993), Granovetter (1974), Haag and Lagunoﬀ
(1999), and Morris (2000), among others.
2Many games of interest have multiple equilibria. The study of equilibrium selection
(which manifests itself most sharply in coordination games) therefore occupies a central
place in game theory. We discuss the contribution of our paper to this research in greater
detail below.
3are interested in the nature of networks that emerge and the eﬀects of link
formation on social coordination. We mostly focus on a setting where links
as well as actions in the coordination game are chosen by individuals on
an independent basis. (The idea that links can be one-sided is closer in
spirit to the ﬁrst and third examples of links given above.) This approach
of one-sided links allows us to explore the implications of link formation for
social coordination as part of a non-cooperative game, which facilitates the
exposition greatly.3
We start with a consideration of the static problem. Here we ﬁnd that a
variety of networks – including the complete network, the empty network and
partially connected networks – can be supported at Nash equilibria of the
static (strategic-form) game induced. Moreover, the society can coordinate
on diﬀerent actions and conformism as well as diversity with regard to actions
of individuals is possible at equilibrium. The immediate counterpart of this
multiplicity of Nash equilibria is that any (best-response) learning dynamics
must also has multiple rest points, which in turn motivates an examination
of the stochastic stability of diﬀerent outcomes.
To this end, we propose a dynamic model in which, at regular intervals,
individuals choose links and actions to maximize (myopically) their respective
payoﬀs. Occasionally, they also make errors or experiment. Our interest is
in the nature of long run outcomes, when the probability of these errors is
small. This leads to clear-cut predictions, both concerning the architecture
of networks as well as the nature of social coordination.
First, we show that, provided the costs of link formation are not too high,4
any network architecture that is robust enough to be observed a signiﬁcant
fraction of time in the long run (i.e. occurs at so-called stochastically stable
states) must be complete.5 (Figure 1a gives an example of a complete network
in a society with 4 players, where a ﬁlled circle lying on the edge near a
player indicates that this player has formed, or supports, that link.) This
implies that partially connected networks, even if they deﬁne Nash equilibria
3In a subsequent section we elaborate on alternative formulations of link formation and
argue that the main insights are robust to a variety of modiﬁcations (see Section 4).
4Of course, if the linking cost is higher than the maximum payoﬀ in the coordination
game, only the empty network can prevail.
5In a complete network, every pair of players is directly linked.
4of the social game (and thus rest-points of the perturbation-free best-response
dynamics), are just ephemeral situations in the long run.
Secondly, we also ﬁnd that in the long-run states (where the social net-
work is complete), players always coordinate on the same action, i.e. social
conformism obtains. However, the speciﬁc nature of coordination sharply
depends on the costs of link formation. There is a threshold value in the
interior of the payoﬀ range such that, if the costs of link formation are below
the threshold, players coordinate on the risk-dominant action. In contrast, if
those costs are above that threshold, players coordinate on the eﬃcient ac-
tion at all stochastically stable states. This is the content of our main result,
Theorem 4. In sum, therefore, our analysis reveals that, even though the
eventual architecture of the social network is the same (i.e. complete) in all
“robust” cases, the process of network formation (i.e. the dynamics by which
links are created and destroyed out of equilibrium) has crucial implications
for the nature of social coordination. Speciﬁcally, it leads to very diﬀerent
conclusions concerning the strategy choice selected in the long run, as the
magnitude of linking costs changes. We elaborate on some aspects of these




















First, we stress that the dynamics of link formation play a crucial role in
the model. Despite the fact that the only architecture that is stochastically
stable (within the interesting parameter range) is the complete one, players’
behavior in the coordination game is diﬀerent depending on the costs of
forming links. But if the network were to remain ﬁxed throughout, standard
arguments indicate that the risk-dominant action must prevail in the long
run (cf. Kandori, Mailath and Rob, 1993). This serves to highlight the fact
5that, indeed, it is the link formation process that, by allowing for the co-
evolution of the links and actions, plays a decisive role in shaping individual
behavior in our model.
Second, we want to develop some intuition on the sharp relationship found
between the costs of forming links and the corresponding behavior displayed
by players in the coordination game. On the one hand, note the obvious fact
that, if the cost of forming links is small and the gross payoﬀs to be earned in
the game are positive,6 players wish to be linked with everyone irrespective of
the actions they choose. Hence, from an individual perspective, the relative
attractiveness of diﬀerent actions is quite insensitive to what is the network
structure faced by any given player at the time of revising her choices. In
essence, a player must make her fresh choices as if she were in a complete
network. In this case, therefore, the risk dominant and ineﬃcient conven-
tion prevails since, under complete connectivity, this convention is harder to
destabilize (through mutations) than the eﬃcient but risk-dominated one.
By contrast, if costs of forming links are high, individual players choose to
form links only with those who lead to substantial gross payoﬀs. This, in
turn, leads to more selective linking decisions by players and a reduction
in their strategic uncertainty, consequently facilitating the emergence of the
eﬃcient action.
Third, we elaborate on the role of cost-bearing in link formation. In our
model, links are one-sided, i.e. they are taken at the initiative of one player,
who also incurs its cost. This brings in the issue of externalities in the link
formation process and the potential for free-rider problems. But perhaps
more interestingly, it also has an important bearing on the diﬀerent vul-
nerability to change displayed by the very diﬀerent ways of supporting a
given architecture.7 To ﬁx ideas, consider a state where the social network
is complete and all players choose a common action. What is the underlying
pattern of links that makes some such state more fragile to a particular set
of mutations? A moment’s reﬂection suggests that the particular state of
6The role played by our assumption that the game payoﬀs are positive (or at least
non-negative) is discussed in Subsection 2.2. In Section 4, we contemplate alternative
variations of the model that may dispense with it.
7Note, for example, that there are 2n(n−1)/2 strategy proﬁles that support (with non-
redundant links) a complete network with n players. Clearly, these strategy proﬁles allow
for wide variation in the number of links formed by individual players (and hence also a
wide range of payoﬀs).
6that kind which is most fragile is the one where the mutant players induce
the strongest externalities (and thus incentives to change) on the rest of the
players. This happens when, collectively, all of the mutants support (i.e.
have active) links to the remaining players. If, for concreteness, the mutants
are indexed from 1 to k and the other players from k +1t on, some such
(complete) network would be one where every player i supports a link to
every other player with higher index. In fact, our analysis yields the insight
that such a highly asymmetric pattern of connections enhances the fragility
of otherwise stationary states and thus must be at the origin of the paths of
least-resistance that underlie the notion of stochastic stability.8 This, again,
serves to illustrate the interplay between network structure and action choice
that is at the heart of our analysis.
We now place the paper and the results in the context of the literature.
Traditionally, sociologists have held the view that individual actions, and in
turn aggregate outcomes, are in large part determined by interaction struc-
ture. By contrast, economists have tended to focus on markets, where social
ties and the speciﬁc features of the interaction structures between agents
are typically not important. In recent years, economists have examined in
greater detail the role of interaction structure and found that it plays an im-
portant role in shaping important economic phenomena (see the references
given above, and also Granovetter, 1985). This has led to a study of the
processes through which the structure emerges. The present paper is part of
this general research program.
Next, we relate the paper to work in economics. The paper contributes to two
research areas: network formation games and equilibrium selection/coordination
problems. In earlier work on network formation it is assumed that the sole
concern of players is whom they connect to – i.e. the only strategic con-
siderations are associated to their linking decisions (see e.g., Aumann and
Myerson (1989), Bala and Goyal (2000), Dutta, van den Nouweland and Tijs
8This observation is related to some recent work by Albert, Jeong, and Barab´ asi (2000)
on the error and attack tolerance displayed by diﬀerent network arrangements. Speciﬁcally,
these authors show that the inhomogenous connectivity of many complex networks (e.g.
the World-Wide Web, where some nodes bear many links whereas most others only have
a few) makes them rather fragile to targeted attack although very tolerant to unguided
error. In our case, where mutation probabilities are conceived as very small, the “attack
fragility” is the dominant consideration and this lends to inhomogenous networks their
key role in the analysis.
7(1995), and Jackson and Wolinsky (1996)). By contrast, the present paper
presents a uniﬁed framework in which the emergence of social networks and
the behavior of linked players can be jointly studied.9
Next we outline brieﬂy the relationship of our paper to the literature on
equilibrium selection in games. In many games of interest, multiple equi-
libria arise naturally, and so recent years have seen a considerable amount
of research on equilibrium selection/coordination.10 An important ﬁnding of
this work is that interaction structure (i.e. the social network) matters and
that, by varying it, the rate of change as well as the long run outcome can
be signiﬁcantly altered.11 This underscores the importance of endogenizing
the social network, i.e., examining the circumstances under which diﬀerent
interaction patterns emerge. From a methodological point of view, a natural
way to do this is by assessing the stochastic stability of the diﬀerent net-
works arising at Nash equilibria. This is the route undertaken in the present
paper, where we adapt the techniques customarily used in the evolutionary
literature to the present scenario (where players choose not only actions but
partners as well).
Somewhat more speciﬁcally, the present approach is related in spirit to that
subbranch of recent evolutionary literature where players are allowed to move
among a ﬁxed set of locations.12 The basic insight ﬂowing from it is that,
if individuals can separate/insulate themselves easily from those who are
9In independent work, Droste, Gilles and Johnson (1999), Jackson and Watts (1999)
and Skyrms and Pemantle (2000), study endogenous network formation. The ﬁrst and
third paper have a model of link formation based on individual incentives and are more
directly related to our paper. The primary diﬀerence between these papers and our paper
pertains to the timing of actions and links. We assume that the two are simultaneous,
while the earlier papers assume that links and actions are revised one at a time, taking
the other as given. This diﬀerence leads to diﬀerent conclusions. We further discuss the
issue of timing of actions and links in Subsection 4.3 below.
10One strand of this work considers dynamic models. This work includes Blume (1993),
Canning (1992), Ellison (1993), Kandori, Mailath and Rob (1993), and Young (1993),
among others. For a consideration of this same equilibrium selection problem from a
diﬀerent (“eductive”) perspective, the reader may refer to the work of Harsanyi and Selten
(1988) or the more recent paper by Carlson and van Damme (1993).
11See, for example, Ellison (1993), Goyal (1996), Lee and Valentinyi (2000), and Morris
(2000), and Robson and Vega-Redondo (1996), among others.
12See e.g. Ely (1996), Mailath, Samuelson and Shaked (1994), Oechssler (1997), or
Bhaskar and Vega-Redondo (2000), among others.
8playing an ineﬃcient action (e.g., the risk-dominant action), then eﬃcient
“enclaves” will be readily formed and eventually attract the “migration” of
others (who will therefore turn to playing eﬃciently). In a rough sense, one
may be inclined to identify easy mobility with low costs of forming links.
However, the considerations involved in each case turn out to be very diﬀer-
ent, as is evident from the stark contrast between our conclusions and those
of the mobility literature (recall the above summary). There are two main
reasons for this contrast. First, in our case, players do not indirectly choose
their pattern of interaction with others by moving across a pre-speciﬁed net-
work of locations (as in the case of player mobility). Rather, they construct
directly their interaction network (with no exogenous restrictions) by choos-
ing those agents with whom they want to play the game. Second, the cost
of link formation is paid per link formed and thus becomes truly eﬀective
only if it is high enough. In a heuristic sense, we may say that it is pre-
cisely the restricted “mobility” that high costs induce which helps insulate
(and thus protect) the individuals who are choosing the eﬃcient action. If
the link-formation costs are too low, the extensive interaction this facilitates
may have the unfortunate consequence of rendering risk-dominance consid-
erations decisive.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2describes the frame-
work. Section 3 presents the results for the basic model. Section 4 explores a
variety of modiﬁcations in the model that consider alternative link-formation
rules or allow for players to interact with directly as well as indirectly linked
players. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
2.1 Networks
Let N = {1,2,...,n} be a set of players, where n ≥ 3. We are interested
in modelling a situation where each of these players can choose the subset
of other players with whom to play a ﬁxed bilateral game. Formally, let
gi =( gi1,...g i,i−1,g i,i+1,...g in) be the set of links formed by player i.W e
suppose that gij ∈{ 1,0}, and say that player i forms a link with player j
if gij = 1. The set of link options is denoted by Gi. Any player proﬁle of
link decisions g =( g1,g 2 ...g n) deﬁnes a directed graph, called a network.
Abusing notation, the network will also be denoted by g.
9Speciﬁcally, the network g has the set of players N as its set of vertices while
its set of arrows, Γ ⊂ N × N, is deﬁned as follows: Γ = {(i,j) ∈ N × N :
gij =1 }. Graphically, the link (i,j) may be represented as an edge between i
and j, a ﬁlled circle lying on the edge near agent i indicating that this agent
has formed (or supports) that link. Every link proﬁle g ∈Ghas a unique
representation in this manner. Figure 2below depicts an example. In it,
player 1 has formed links with players 2and 3, player 3 has formed a link
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Given a network g, we say that a pair of players i and j are directly linked
if at least one of them has established a linked with the other one, i.e. if
max{gij,g ji} = 1. To describe the pattern of players’ links, it is useful
to deﬁne a modiﬁed version of g, denoted by ¯ g, that is deﬁned as follows:
¯ gij =m a x {gij,g ji} for each i and j in N.N o t e t h a t ¯ gij =¯ gji so that the
index order is irrelevant. We refer to gij as an active link for player i and a
passive link for player j.
We say there is a path between i and j if either ¯ gij =m a x {gij,g ji} =1o r
there exist agents j1,...,jm distinct from each other and i and j such that
¯ gi,j1 = ···=¯ gjk,jk+1 = ···¯ gjm,j =1 .A sub-graph g  ⊂ g is called a component
of g if for all i,j ∈ g , i  = j, there exists a path in g  connecting i and
j, and for all i ∈ g  and j ∈ g, gij = 1 implies g 
ij =1 . An e t w o r kw i t h
only one component is called connected. On the other hand, a network (or
a component) is said to be complete if every pair of nodes in it is connected
by a link in either direction (recall Figure 1a). Finally, a network is called
minimally connected if the removal of any single link renders it disconnected.
A simple example of such a network is provided by the center-sponsored star
of Figure 1b.
13Since agents choose strategies independently of each other, two agents may simulta-
neously initiate a two-way link, as seen in the ﬁgure.
102.2 Social Game
Individuals located in a social network play a 2×2symmetric game in strate-
gic form with common action set. The set of partners of player i depends
on her location in the network. In the basic model we assume that two in-
dividuals can play a game if, and only if, they have a direct link between
them.
We now describe the bilateral game that is played between any two partners.
The set of actions is A = {α,β}. For each pair of actions a,a  ∈ A, the payoﬀ







We shall assume that the game is one of coordination with two pure strategy
equilibria, (α,α)a n dβ,β). Without loss of generality we will assume that
(α,α) is the eﬃcient equilibrium. Finally, in order to focus on the interesting
case, we will assume that there is a conﬂict between eﬃciency and risk-
dominance. These considerations are summarized in the following restrictions
on the payoﬀs.14
d>f; b>e ; d>b ; d + e<b+ f. (1)
An important feature of our approach is that links are costly. Speciﬁcally,
every agent who establishes a link with some other player incurs a cost c>0.
Thus, we suppose that the cost of forming each link is independent of the
number of links being established and is the same across all players.
14Our results extend in a natural way in case the risk-dominant equilibrium is also
eﬃcient, i.e., if d + e>b+ f. In particular, players coordinate on the (α,α) equilibrium,
which is risk-dominant as well as eﬃcient, in the long run.
11In the basic model we assume that links are one-sided. This aspect of the
model allows us to use standard solution concepts from non-cooperative game
theory in addressing the issue of link formation. We shall suppose that the
payoﬀs in the bilateral game are all positive and, therefore, no player has
any incentive to refuse links initiated by other players. There are diﬀerent
ways in which the assumption of positive payoﬀs in the coordination game
can be relaxed. One route is to dispense with any restriction on payoﬀs but
suppose that, when player i supports a link to player j, the payoﬀ (which
may be negative) ﬂows only to i. This formulation may be interpreted as
reﬂecting a model of peer groups and fashion, where asymmetric ﬂow of
inﬂuence seems a natural feature. Another possible route to tackle possibly
negative payoﬀs would be to maintain the bilateral nature of payoﬀs but give
players the option to refuse the links initiated by others. We discuss a variety
of alternative formulations of the link formation process in section 4.
Every player i is obliged to choose the same action in the (possibly) several
bilateral games that she is engaged in. This assumption is natural in the
present context: if players were allowed to choose a diﬀerent action for every
two-person game they are involved in, this would make the behavior of players
in any particular game insensitive to the network structure. Thus, combining
the former considerations, the strategy space of a player can be identiﬁed with
Si = Gi × A, where Gi is the set of possible link decisions by i and A is the
common action space of the underlying bilateral game.15
We can now present the payoﬀs of the social game. Given the link decisions
of players, g =( g1,g 2,...,gn), let N(i;g) ≡{ j ∈ N : gij =1 } be the set of
agents in the induced network with whom player i has established links, while
ν(i;g) ≡| N(i;g)| is its cardinality. Similarly, denote by N(i;¯ g) ≡{ j ∈ N :
¯ gij =1 } the set of agents with whom player i is directly connected (by active
or passive links), while ν(i;¯ g) ≡| N(i;¯ g)| stands for the cardinality of this set.
Then, given the strategies of other players, s−i =( s1,...s i−1,s i+1,...s n), the
15In our formulation, players choose links and actions in the coordination game at the
same time. An alternative formulation would be to have players choose links ﬁrst and
then choose actions, contingent on the nature of the network observed. Finally another
alternative, considered by the literature, is to postulate that the action and every link are
revised separately (cf. Footnote 9 and Subsection 4.3).




π(ai,a j) − ν(i;g) · c. (2)
We note that the individual payoﬀs are aggregated across the games played
by him. In much of earlier work, e.g. Kandori, Mailath and Rob (1993) or
Ellison (1993), the distinction between average or total payoﬀs was irrelevant
since the size of the neighborhood was given. In our model, however, where
the number of games an agent plays is endogenous, we want to explicitly
account for the inﬂuence of the size of the neighborhood and thus choose the
aggregate-payoﬀ formulation.16
These payoﬀ expressions allow us to particularize the standard notion of
Nash Equilibrium to each of the two alternative scenarios. Thus, for the
model with direct links, a strategy proﬁle s∗ =( s∗
1,...s ∗
n)i ss a i dt ob ea







−i), ∀si ∈ Si. (3)
On the other hand, a Nash equilibrium in either scenario will be called strict
if every player gets a strictly higher payoﬀ with her current strategy than she
would with any other strategy. The set of Nash equilibria will be denoted by
S∗ and that of strict Nash equilibria by S∗∗.
2.3Dynamics
Time is modeled discretely, t =1 ,2,3,....A te a c ht, the state of the system
is given by the strategy proﬁle s(t) ≡ [(gi(t),a i(t))]n
i=1 specifying the action
played, and links established, by each player i ∈ N. At every period t,t h e r e
is a positive independent probability p ∈ (0,1) that any given individual gets
a chance to revise her strategy. If she receives this opportunity, we assume
that she selects a new strategy
si(t) ∈ argmax
si∈Si
Πi(si,s −i(t − 1)). (4)
16When players seek to maximize average payoﬀs, the size of the interaction group plays
no essential role and we conjecture that at least some eﬃcient state (i.e. a state where all
players choose action α) must be stochastically stable. The intuition for this conjecture is
that when neighborhood size is irrelevant per se it should be particularly easy to destabilize
ineﬃcient states.
13That is, she selects a best response to what other players chose in the pre-
ceding period.17 If there are several strategies that fulﬁll (4), then any one
of them is taken to be selected with, say, equal probability. This strategy
revision process deﬁnes a simple Markov chain on S ≡ S1 × ... × Sn. In our
setting, which will be seen to display multiple strict equilibria, there are sev-
eral absorbing states of the Markov chain.18 This motivates the examination
of the relative robustness of each of them.
To do so, we rely on the approach proposed by Kandori, Mailath and Rob
(1993), and Young (1993). We suppose that, occasionally, players make
mistakes, experiment, or simply disregard payoﬀ considerations in choosing
their strategies. Speciﬁcally, we assume that, conditional on receiving a
revision opportunity, a player chooses her strategy at random with some
small “mutation” probability  >0. For any  >0, the process deﬁnes a
Markov chain that is aperiodic and irreducible and, therefore, has a unique
invariant probability distribution. Let us denote this distribution by µ .W e
analyze the form of µ  as the probability of mistakes becomes very small,
i.e. formally, as   converges to zero. Deﬁne lim →0 µ  =ˆ µ. When a state
s =( s1,s 2,...,s n)h a sˆ µ(s) > 0, i.e. it is in the support of ˆ µ,w es a yt h a t
it is stochastically stable. Intuitively, this reﬂects the idea that, even for
inﬁnitesimal mutation probability (and independently of initial conditions),
this state materializes a signiﬁcant fraction of time in the long run.
3Evolving networks and social coordination
We ﬁrst characterize the Nash equilibrium of the social game. We then
provide a complete characterization of the set of stochastically stable social
outcomes.
3.1 Equilibrium outcomes
Our ﬁrst result concerns the nature of networks that arise in equilibria. If
costs of link formation are low (c<e ), then a player has an incentive to
17We are implicitly assuming that players have complete information the network struc-
ture as well as the proﬁle of actions. This assumption simpliﬁes the strategy choice signif-
icantly in a setting where a player can potentially play with everyone else in the society.
18We note that the set of absorbing states of the Markov chain coincides with the set of
strict Nash equilibria of the one-shot game.
14link up with other players irrespective of the actions the other players are
choosing. On the other hand, when costs are quite high (speciﬁcally, b<c<
d) then everyone who is linked must be choosing the eﬃcient action. This,
however, implies that it is attractive to form a link with every other player
and we get the complete network again. Thus, for relatively low and high
costs, we should expect to see the complete network. In contrast, if costs are
at an intermediate level (f<c<b ), a richer set of conﬁgurations is possible.
On the one hand, since c>f (>e ), the link formation is only worthwhile
if other players are choosing the same action. On the other hand, since
c<b (<d ), coordinating at either of the two equilibria (in the underlying
coordination game) is better than not playing the game at all. This allows
for networks with two disconnected components in equilibria. The former
considerations are reﬂected by the following result, whose proof is given in
Appendix.
Proposition 1 Suppose (1) and (2) hold.(a) If c<min{f,b}, then an equi-
librium network is complete.(b) If f<c<b ,then an equilibrium network
is either complete or can be partitioned into two complete components.19 (c)
If b<c<d ,then an equilibrium network is either empty or complete.(d) If
c>d ,then the unique equilibrium network is empty.
Next, we characterize the Nash equilibria of the static game. First, we in-
troduce some convenient notation. On the one hand, recall that ge denotes
the empty network characterized by ge
ij = 0 for all i,j ∈ N (i  = j). We
shall say that a network g is essential if gijgji = 0, for every pair of players
i and j. Also, let Gc ≡{ g : ∀i,j ∈ N, ¯ gij =1 ,g ijgji =0 } stand for the
set of complete and essential networks on the set N. Analogously, for any
given subset M ⊂ N, denote by Gc(M) the set of complete and essential
subgraphs on M. Given any state s ∈ S, we shall say that s =( g,a) ∈ Sh
for some h ∈{ α,β} if g ∈ Gc and ai = h for all i ∈ N. More generally, we
shall write s =( g,a) ∈ Sαβ if there exists a partition of the population into
two subgroups, Nα and Nβ (one of them possibly empty), and corresponding
components of g, gα and gβ, such that: (i) ga ∈ Gc(Nα),g β ∈ Gc(Nβ); and
(ii) ∀i ∈ Nα,a i = α; ∀i ∈ Nβ, ai = β. With this notation in hand, we may
state the following result.
19Our parameter conditions allow both f<band b<f .If the latter inequality holds,
Part (b) of Proposition 1 (and also that of Proposition 2 below) applies trivially.
15Proposition 2 Suppose (1) and (2) hold.(a) If c<min{f,b}, then the set
of equilibrium states S∗ = Sα∪Sβ.(b) If f<c<b ,then Sα∪Sβ ⊂ S∗ ⊂ Sαβ,
the ﬁrst inclusion being strict for large enough n. (c) If b<c<d ,then
S∗ = Sα ∪{ (ge,(β,β,...,β))}.(d) If c>d ,then S∗ = {ge}×An.
Parts (a) and (c) are intuitive; we therefore elaborate on the coexistence
equilibria identiﬁed in part (b). In these equilibria, there are two unconnected
groups, with each group adopting a common action (diﬀerent in each group).
The strategic stability of this conﬁguration rests on the appeal of ‘passive’
links. A link such as gij = 1 is paid for by player i, but both players i and
j derive payoﬀs from it. In a mixed equilibrium conﬁguration, the links in
each group must be, roughly, evenly distributed. This means that all players
enjoy some beneﬁts from passive links. In contrast, if a player were to switch
actions, then to derive the full beneﬁts of this switch, she would have to form
(active) links with everyone in the new group. This lowers the incentives to
switch, a consideration which becomes decisive if the number of passive links
is large enough (hence the requirement of large n).
The above result indicates that, whenever the cost of links is not excessively
high (i.e. not above the maximum payoﬀ attainable in the game), Nash
equilibrium conditions allow for a genuine outcome multiplicity. For exam-
ple, under the parameter conﬁgurations allowed in Parts (a) and (c), this
multiplicity permits alternative states where either of the two actions is ho-
mogeneously chosen by the whole population. Under the conditions of Part
(b), the multiplicity allows for a wide range of possible states where neither
action homogeneity nor full connectedness necessarily prevails. The model,
therefore, raises a fundamental issue of equilibrium selection.
3.2 Dynamics
This section addresses the problem of equilibrium selection by using the
techniques of stochastic stability. As a ﬁrst step in this analysis, we establish
convergence of the unperturbed dynamics for the relevant parameter range.
Let ¯ S denote the set of absorbing states of the unperturbed dynamics. In
view of the postulated adjustment process, it follows that there is an one-
to-one correspondence between ¯ S and the class of strict Nash equilibria of
the social game, i.e. ¯ S = S∗∗. Proposition 2characterizes all Nash equilibria
16of this game. But, clearly, if c<b ,every Nash equilibrium is strict, while
if b<c<d ,only the Nash equilibria in Sα are strict. Since, on the other
hand, no strict Nash equilibrium exists if c>d , the next result focuses on
the case where c<d .
Proposition 3 Suppose (1)-(2) hold and c<d .Then, starting from any
initial strategy conﬁguration, the best response dynamics converges to a strict
Nash equilibrium of the social game, with probability one.
The proof of the above result is given in Appendix. This result delimits the
set of states that can potentially be stochastically stable since, obviously,
every such state must be a limit point for the unperturbed dynamics. Let
the set of stochastically stable states be denoted by ˆ S ≡{ s ∈ S :ˆ µ(s) > 0}.
The following result summarizes our analysis.
Theorem 4 Suppose (1) and (2) hold.There exists some ¯ c ∈ (e,b) such
that if c<¯ c then ˆ S = Sβ while if ¯ c<c<dthen ˆ S = Sα, provided n is large
enough.20 Finally, if c>dthen ˆ S = {ge}×An.
Recall that a social outcome is stochastically stable if it lies in the support of
the limit distribution, ˆ µ. In order to determine this support we use the well-
known graph-theoretic techniques developed by Freidlin and Wentzell (1984)
for the analysis of perturbed Markov chains, as applied by the aforementioned
authors (Kandori et al. and Young) . They can be summarized as follows.
Fix some state s ∈ ¯ S.A ns-tree is a directed graph on ¯ S whose root is s and
such that there is a unique (directed) path joining any other s  ∈ ¯ S to s. For
each arrow s  → s   in any given s-tree, a “cost” is deﬁned as the minimum
number of simultaneous mutations that are required for the transition from
s  to s   to be feasible through the ensuing operation of the unperturbed
dynamics alone. The cost of the tree is obtained by adding up the costs
associated with all the arrows of a particular s-tree. The stochastic potential
of s is deﬁned as the minimum cost across all s-trees. Then, a state s ∈ ¯ S is
seen to be stochastically stable if it has the lowest stochastic potential across
all s ∈ ¯ S.
In our framework, individual strategies involve both link-formation and ac-
tion choices. This richness in the strategy space leads to a corresponding
20The proviso on n is simply required to deal with possible integer problems when
studying the number of mutations needed for the various transitions.
17wide variety in the nature of (strict) Nash equilibria of the social game.
There are two facets of this variety: (a) we obtain three diﬀerent types of
equilibria in terms of action conﬁguration: Sα, Sβ and Sαβ; and (b) there are
a large number of strategy proﬁles that support the complete connectivity
prevailing at equilibrium conﬁgurations - recall Footnote 7. This prolifer-
ation of equilibria leads us to develop a simple relationship between the
diﬀerent proﬁles. In particular, we consider strategy proﬁles within the sets
Sh (h = α,β) and show that states in each of these sets can be connected
by a chain of single-mutation steps, each such step followed by a suitable
operation of the best-response dynamics. To state this result precisely, it
is convenient to introduce the metric d(·) on the space of networks that,
for each pair of networks g and g , has their respective distance given by
d(g,g )=d(g ,g) ≡

i,j |gi,j − g 
i,j|/2. In words, this distance is simply a
measure of the number of links that are diﬀerent across the two networks.
With this metric in place, we have:
Lemma 5 For each s ∈ Sh, h = α,β, there exists an s-tree restricted to Sh
such that for all arrows s  → s   in it, d(g ,g  )=1 , where g  and g   are the
networks respectively associated to s  and s  .
The proof of this lemma is given in Appendix. This lemma implies that,
provided Sh ⊂ ¯ S,the (restricted) tree established by Lemma 5 for any s ∈ Sh
involves the minimum possible cost

Sh
−1. This lemma also indicates that,
in the language of Samuelson (1994), Sα (if c<d )a n da l s oSβ (if c<b )a r e
recurrent sets. This allows each of them to be treated as a single “entity”
in the following two complementary senses: (i) if any state in one of these
recurrent sets is stochastically stable, so is every other state in this same
set; (ii) in evaluating the minimum cost involved in a transition to, or away
from, any given state in a recurrent set, the sole relevant issue concerns the
minimum cost associated to a transition to, or away from, some state in
that recurrent set. Using (i)-(ii), the analysis of the model can be greatly
simpliﬁed. To organize matters, it is useful to consider diﬀerent ranges for c
separately.
Let us start with the case where 0 <c<e , where the set of absorbing states
¯ S = Sα ∪ Sβ. Since, by Lemma 5, the sets Sα and Sβ are each recurrent,
the crucial point here is to assess what is the minimum mutation cost across
all path joining some state in Sh to some state in Sh for each h,h  = α,β,
18h  = h . Denote these mutation costs by mh,h and let  z  stand for the
smallest integer no smaller than any given z ∈R +. With this notation in
place, we state:.
















Thus, mβ,α >m α,β, for large enough n.
The proof, given in Appendix, reﬂects the standard considerations arising in
much of the recent evolutionary theory when the ﬁxed pattern of interaction
involves every individual of the population playing with all others. Now, if
costs are low (c<e ), such full connectivity is not just assumed but it endoge-
nously follows from players’ own decisions, both at equilibrium (i.e. when
the unperturbed best-response dynamics is at a rest-point) and away from
it. In eﬀect, this implies that the same basin-of-attraction considerations
that privilege risk-dominance in the received approach also select for it in
the present case.
We next examine the case where e<c<min{f,b} where ¯ S = Sα∪Sβ.N o w ,
since c>e ,players who choose action α no longer ﬁnd it attractive to form
links with other players who choose action β. This factor plays a crucial role
in the analysis. The following result derives the relative magnitude of the
minimum mutation costs.
















Thus, there is some ˜ c, e < ˜ c ≤ min{f,b}, such that if c<˜ c then mβ,α −
mα,β > 0, while if c>˜ c then mβ,α − mα,β < 0, for large enough n.
The methods used to prove this lemma are quite general; we use them in
establishing a number of other lemmas required for the proof of Theorem 4.
It is therefore useful to explain them in the text.
Proof of Lemma 7: Let sα and sβ be generic states in Sα and Sβ, respec-
tively.
19Step 1: Consider transitions from state sβ to state sα and let k be the number
of mutations triggering it. If this transition is to take place after those many
mutations, there must be some player currently choosing β (i.e. who has
not mutated) that may then voluntarily switch to α.D e n o t e b y qh the
number of active links this player chooses to support to players choosing h
(h = α,β)a n dl e trh stand for the number of passive links she receives from




α(d − c), (5)
where we implicitly use the fact that qβ must equal zero – since c>e ,
an agent who switches to α will not ﬁnd it worthwhile to support any link
to players choosing β. On the other hand, if the agent in question were to




α(f − c)+ˆ q
β(b − c), (6)
where ˆ qh and ˆ rh are interpreted as the active and passive links that would be
chosen by the player if she decided to adopt β. Clearly, we must have rh =ˆ rh
for each h = α,β. Thus, if a switch to α is to take place, it must be that





β(b − e) − ˆ q
β(b − c) ≥ 0. (7)
Note that rα + qα = k,s i n c ec<dand therefore the player who switches to
α will want to be linked (either passively or by supporting herself a link) to
all other players choosing α, i.e. to the total number k of α-mutants. On the
other hand, since c<min{f,b}, we must also have that ˆ rβ +ˆ qβ = n − k − 1
and rα+ˆ qα =ˆ rα+ˆ qα = k, i.e. the player who chooses β must become linked
to all other players, both those choosing β and those choosing α.
We now ask the following question: What is the lowest value of k consistent
with (7)? Since c>e ,the desired payoﬀ advantage of action α will occur for
t h el o w e s tv a l u eo fk when rβ =ˆ rβ = 0 and therefore ˆ qβ = n−k−1. That is,
if the desired transition is to take place, the necessary condition (7) holds for
the minimum number of required mutations when the arbitrary agent that
must start the transition has no passive links to individuals choosing action
β. Recall that mβ,α stands for the minimum number of mutations required
for the transition. Now introducing the above observations in (7), we obtain




(d − f)+( b − c)
(n − 1) ≡ H. (8)
20The above expression gives the minimum number of players choosing α that
are needed to induce some player to switch to action α across all possible
network structures. Next, we argue that this number of mutations is also
suﬃcient to induce a transition from some sβ to some sα. The proof is
constructive. The main idea is to consider a particular state sβ where its
corresponding (complete) network displays the maximal responsiveness to
some suitably chosen mutations. Using the observations on the distribution
of active and passive links, this is seen to occur when there are some players
who support links to all others – those are, of course, players with a “critical”
role whose mutation would be most eﬀective. Speciﬁcally, suppose that the
network prevailing in sβ has every player i =1 ,2,...,n support active links
to all j>i . (This means, for example, that player 1 supports links to
every other player whereas player n only has passive links.) Then, recalling
that  z  denotes the smallest integer no smaller than z, the most mutation-
eﬀective way of inducing the population to switch actions from β to α is
precisely by having the players   =1 ,2,..., H  simultaneously mutate to
action α and maintain all their links. Thereafter, a transition to some state
sα will occur if subsequent strategy revision opportunities are appropriately
sequenced so that every player with index j =  H +1,...,n is given a revision
opportunity in order. This, in eﬀect, shows that the lower bound in (8) is
tight and mβ,α =  H .
Step 2: Consider next the transition from some state sα to a state sβ and let
again k be the number of mutations (now towards β) triggering it. Using




(d − f)+( b − e)
(n − 1) ≡ H
 . (9)
Again, we can use previous arguments to show that  H   is suﬃcient.
Step 3: Finally, we wish to study the diﬀerence mβ,α − mα,β as a function of
c. For low c (close to e)a n dl a r g en, this diﬀerence is clearly positive in view
of the hypothesis that b − e>d− f. Next, to verify that it switches strict
sign at most once in the range c ∈ (e,min{f,b}), note that H −H  is strictly
declining with respect to c in the interval (e,min{f,b}).  
Lemma 7 applies both to the case where b<fand that where b>f .Suppose
ﬁrst that b<f .Then, since H − H  < 0 for c = b, a direct combination of
21former considerations leads to the desired conclusion for the parameter range
c ∈ (e,b]. We now take up the case f<band focus on the range c ∈ (f,b).
We ﬁrst derive the relative magnitude of the minimum mutation costs for
s ∈ Sh,w h e r eh = {α,β}.
















Thus there is a threshold ˇ c ∈ [f,b) such that if c<ˇ c then mβ,α − mα,β > 0,
while if c>ˇ c then mβ,α − mα,β < 0, for large enough n.
The arguments needed to establish this result are very similar to those used
in the proof of Lemma 7; we provide the computations in Appendix.
The principal complication in case c ∈ [f,b) is that the set of absorbing
states in not restricted to Sα ∪ Sβ but will generally include mixed states
where the population is segmented into two diﬀerent action components (cf.
Propositions 2and 3). Let mh,αβ, for h = α,β, denote the minimum number
of mutations needed to ensure a transition from some s ∈ Sh to some s ∈
Sαβ. The ﬁrst point to note is that by the construction used in Lemma 7,
mα,αβ ≥ mα,β and, similarly, mβ,αβ ≥ mβ,α. This implies that the transition
from any state in some Sh towards a mixed equilibrium state in Sαβ is not
costlier than a transition towards Sh (h   = h). Concerning now the converse
transitions (i.e. from states in Sαβ to either Sα or Sβ), the following lemma
indicates that it is relatively “easy” since it involves a suitable chain of single
mutations..
Lemma 9 Let f<c<band consider any equilibrium state s ∈ Sαβ involv-
ing two non-degenerate (α and β) components, gα and gβ, with cardinalities
| A(s) |> 0 and | B(s) |> 0, respectively.Then, there is another equilibrium
state s  with cardinality for the resulting α component |A(s )|≥| A(s)| +1
that can be reached from s by a suitable single mutation followed by the best-
response dynamics.An identical conclusion applies to some equilibrium state
s   with | A(s  ) |≤| A(s) |− 1.
The proof of this Lemma is given in Appendix. We brieﬂy sketch the argu-
ment here. Fix some mixed state, and suppose the strategy of some player
22i ∈ A(s) mutates as follows: she switches to action β, while everything else
remains as before. Now, have all the players in the α group move and sup-
pose that they still wish to keep playing action α.S i n c e c>f ,t h e i rb e s t
response is to delete their links with player i. Next, have all the players in
group β move; their best response is to form a link with player i.T h i s i s
true since the original state was an equilibrium, and c<b . Finally, have
player i choose a best response; since the original state was an equilibrium
and c>f , her best response is to play action β and delete all links with
players in the α group. We have thus increased the number of β players
with a single mutation. This argument extends in a natural manner to prove
the above result. We now have all the information to complete the proof of
Theorem 4.
Proof of Theorem 4: Consider ﬁrst the case where c<b .I ff>b ,the sets
Sα and Sβ are the only candidates for stochastic stability and we simply need
to compare mα,β versus mβ,α. Then, the desired conclusion follows directly
from Lemmas 6-8. The same applies if f<bbut c<f .Thus, consider
the case where f<c<b .Then, the states in Sα, Sβ, and Sαβ are possible
candidates for stochastic stability. Take any state s ∈ Sh for some h = α,β.
With the help of Lemmas 5 and 9 we can infer that s-trees for any s ∈ Sα
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any s  ∈ Sβ, the situation is symmetric, the minimum cost being equal to






 − 2. Next, concerning any s ∈ Sαβ,w en o t et h a t
the corresponding s-tree would have to display a path joining some state
in Sα to s and some path joining some state in Sβ to s. Thus, the cost of









 − 3. This
expression is greater than the minimum s-tree costs for s ∈ Sh (h = α,β)
since each mh,h > 1 if the population is large. We therefore conclude that a
state s ∈ Sαβ cannot be stochastically stable. Again, therefore, the problem
boils down to a comparison of mα,β versus mβ,α which, as before, leads to
the desired conclusion.
Next, suppose that b<c<d .Then, the key point to observe is that the
set of strict Nash equilibria and hence the set of absorbing states is simply
¯ S = Sα. This immediately establishes the result for this case. Finally, similar
considerations apply to the case where c>d ,in which case Propositions 2
and 3 indicate that ¯ S = {ge}×An.  
In our analysis we have not placed any restrictions on the number of links
23a player can form and, in equilibrium, the nature of interaction is ‘global’.
This has the implication that transitions from one strict Nash equilibrium
to another require a number of mutations which is a proportion of the total
number of players. As is well known, for large populations this implies that
the rate of convergence will be slow. In Subsection 4.4 we discuss the possi-
bility that players might be limited in the number of links they can support,
a modelling feature which would have a signiﬁcant bearing on this issue.
4 Discussion of the assumptions
In this section, we discuss the main assumptions underlying the analysis. We
do so by addressing in turn a number of variations of the basic model that
highlight the role played by some of its key features. Due to space constraints,
we cannot present the diﬀerent models in detail, nor therefore state formally
and prove the results we have obtained. However, a full account of the proofs
is available from the authors upon request.
4.1 The nature of link formation
An important aspect of our model is that link formation is one-sided. From
a methodological point of view this formulation has the advantage that it
allows us to study the social process of link formation and coordination as
a non-cooperative game; from a substantive viewpoint this formulation is
interesting since it allows for an explicit consideration of the role of active and
passive links. To clarify this assumption, we explore in turn two variations
of the model. In the ﬁrst one, we maintain the feature that any link must
be unilaterally decided by a particular player, but suppose that she alone
derives the beneﬁts of it. That is, the cost of links and the ﬂow of beneﬁts
are both one-sided, which makes passive links payoﬀ-irrelevant. In the second
variation, the links are two-sided in the sense that both agents involved must
express the desire to form it and bear an equal share of the linking cost.
However, we keep the feature that such decisions are independently adopted
by each player, and therefore the link-formation process can be modelled as
a non-cooperative game.
One-sided active links: We have carried out a complete analysis of this model,
whose main ﬁndings and implications may be brieﬂy summarized as follows.
24First, in the static setting, we have shown that the only (non-empty) net-
work that can arise is the complete network. Moreover, in this network,
everyone chooses the same action, thus social conformism obtains. These
results demonstrate that coexistence of diﬀerent conventions and the possi-
bility of an unconnected society arises in our basic model solely due to the
presence of (payoﬀ-relevant) passive links. Next we note that a complete net-
work in the present setting with only active links is one in which every player
forms a link with every other player. Thus there is only one possible strategy
conﬁguration that can support the complete network. The only multiplicity
that remains concerns the choice of action: both outcomes, everyone choosing
action α and everyone choosing action β, are possible in equilibrium.
Our analysis of the (stochastic) dynamics reveals that there is a cut-oﬀ value
for the cost of forming links ˆ c ∈ (e,f), such that for all c<ˆ c, the risk-
dominant action β prevails, while for all c>ˆ c, the eﬃcient action α prevails.
It is worth noting that the cut-oﬀ level of costs ˆ c with only active links is
lower than the cut-oﬀ level of costs ¯ c that arises in the presence of active
and passive links. Thus passive links have the eﬀect of making the risk-
dominant action more likely. The intuition behind this ﬁnding is as follows.
In our proof of Theorem 4 we showed that transition across equilibria is
easiest, in terms of ‘the number of mutations required’, when the pattern
of link formation is very asymmetric. This creates the maximum scope for
passive links to act as a bridge to induce other players to switch actions.
This construction also reveals why the risk-dominant strategy is favoured in
a setting with passive links. Passive links allow the connectedness of the
network to be sustained, without costs being incurred by the recipients of
the links. In a situation where players are choosing diﬀerent actions, this has
the eﬀect of creating greater strategic uncertainty. And, as is well known,
such strategic uncertainty acts in favour of the risk-dominant action, which
in turn helps explain why the risk-dominant action prevails under a wider
range of cost conditions once passive links are allowed.
Two-sided links through independent decisions: We next discuss the case
where a link is formed if, and only if, both parties involved oﬀer to form
a link, in which case the linking cost is divided equally.21 We have also
21In this setting we need to make some assumption about the payoﬀ implications of
unreciprocated links. In our analysis, we assume that unreciprocated links involve no
costs and yield no beneﬁts either.
25analyzed this model fully. The ﬁndings are broadly in line with the results of
the one-sided active links model. In the static setting, we show that the only
(non-empty) strict Nash network is the complete network. Moreover, in this
network, everyone chooses the same action, thus social conformism obtains.
The only multiplicity that remains again concerns the choice of action: both
outcomes, everyone choosing action α and everyone choosing action β, are
possible in equilibrium. Our analysis of the (stochastic) dynamics reveals
that there is a cut-oﬀ value for the cost of forming links ˆ c ∈ (e,f)s u c h
that, for all c<ˆ c, the risk-dominant action β prevails, while for all c>ˆ c
the eﬃcient action α prevails. This cut-oﬀ value is, somewhat surprisingly,
identical to the cut-oﬀ value in the one-sided active links model. It is worth
noting, however, that in the two-sided setting the cost of forming a link is 2c
and therefore the precise value of the cut-oﬀ level should be interpreted with
care here. What remains, however, as the most interesting observation is
the similarity in the qualitative features of the result: for low costs the risk-
dominant action prevails, while for high costs the eﬃcient action prevails.
4.2 Negative payoﬀs and link refusal
Throughout the analysis of the basic model we have maintained the assump-
tion that the (gross) payoﬀs to be earned by playing the bilateral game are
all positive. This justiﬁes the formulation that, at a zero linking cost, no
player should refuse a unilateral proposal to play this game. But if this cost
were positive (and higher than some of the payoﬀs in the game) or the game
payoﬀs themselves were negative, such a one-sided approach could be hardly
defended as a meaningful or plausible model of network formation.
To address this issue, we have studied an extension of the basic model
where, after any player receives a unilateral link proposal, this player may
object to forming the link. It is posited, in particular, that at the stage of
possible refusal, the actions chosen by both players are already irreversibly
ﬁxed and therefore the agent in question can safely evaluate whether it is
proﬁtable or not to accept the proposal. As mentioned, this formulation
may accommodate the case where passive links are costly and/or the payoﬀs
of the bilateral game display some negative payoﬀs. And, of course, when
passive links are costless and gross payoﬀs positive, the basic model studied
in this paper follows from that general (one-sided) framework of network
formation as a particular case.
In the context outlined, the main gist of our analysis is that whether
26the eﬃcient state is selected (through the notion of stochastic stability) still
depends on the link cost being high enough. The exact value of the threshold
is not generally the same as in Theorem 4. It always lies, however, between
the lowest equilibrium payoﬀ (i.e. payoﬀ b in Table I) and the lowest payoﬀ
in the game (payoﬀ e).
4.3Simultaneity of actions and links
We assume that players can form links and choose actions simultaneously.
In independent work, Droste, Johnson and Gilles (1999), and Jackson and
Watts (1999) also study a two-sided link model where directly connected
agents play a bilateral game, but allow for players to choose links and actions
in separate revision stages. They ﬁnd that if the costs of link formation are
high, all those states where players choose a common action are stochastically
stable, i.e. either of the two actions may obtain. The contrast with our
analysis arises out of the assumption that individuals choose links and actions
at separate stages, i.e. players choose links taking actions as given while
they choose actions taking the links as a given. Instead, in our setting, any
individual undertaking a revision is allowed to modify both her action and
her supported links. Our arguments pertaining to alternative models of link
formation clarify that it is this simultaneity of actions and link formation
decisions and not the one-sided nature of link formation that is critical for
the diﬀerence in the results. This would motivate an examination of the
eﬀects of varying levels of ﬂexibility in the two choice dimensions, links and
actions – for example, one could allow for the possibility that link revision
might be more rigid than action change.
4.4 Number of links
Another important assumption concerns the number of links allowed or, relat-
edly, the shape (e.g. concavity or convexity) of the underlying cost function.
In our model, we have imposed no limit on the number of links a player can
support and the marginal cost of any additional link has been assumed con-
stant. It is certainly more realistic to assume that players are constrained in
the number of links they can support due to time and resource constraints.
Under this assumption, stable networks will generally be incomplete and
possibly partially connected. We feel that a model with a limited number
27of individual links may also be more amenable to weaker assumptions con-
cerning information on the network and the action proﬁles of players, issues
which are of course interesting in their own right.
4.5 Indirect links
In the real world, social networks are far from complete. This happens be-
cause, in practice, not only there are a large variety of relevant factors that
limit the “linking capacity” of agents (cf. the former subsection) but because
indirect connections often facilitate transactions and make complete networks
unnecessary. Motivated by these latter considerations, we have explored the
role of indirect linkages that facilitate transactions between players. As be-
fore, the focus is on the architecture of stable networks and the inﬂuence of
link formation on the behavior of players.
Consider a model in which two players can play a game if there is a path
between them (recall Subsection 2.1). Given a network g and any two players,
i and j, let us write i
g
←→ j when a path between them exist. Then, we may
deﬁne the indirect neighborhood of a player i by ˆ N(i;g) ≡{ j ∈ N : i
g
←→ j},
i.e. the set of players with whom player i has a path in the network g.W i t h
this notation in place, the payoﬀ to a player i from choosing some strategy




j∈ ˆ N(i;¯ g)
π(ai,a j) − ν(i;g) · c, (10)
where recall that ν(i;g) ≡| N(i;g)| is the cardinality of the set of direct links
established by player i.
In this setting, we ﬁnd that the unique stochastically stable architecture is
the minimally-connected network that we call a center-sponsored star (recall
Figure 1b). We also ﬁnd that there exists a critical cost of forming links, such
that, for costs below this level, players coordinate on the risk-dominant ac-
tion, while for linking costs above this level they coordinate on the eﬃcient
action. Thus, comparing matters with the basic model, we ﬁnd a similar
qualitative conclusion concerning the selection of eﬃciency versus risk dom-
inance although, naturally, the speciﬁc network architecture that underlies
players’ interaction is very diﬀerent. A detailed proof of these results can be
found in our earlier working paper, Goyal and Vega-Redondo (1999).
285 Conclusion
We develop a simple model to study the interaction between partner choice
and individual behavior in games of coordination. We suppose that two play-
ers can play a game only if they have a link between them. Our analysis shows
that individual attempts to balance the costs and beneﬁts of link formation
yield a unique network. We also ﬁnd, however, that the dynamics of net-
work evolution have a powerful impact on the nature of social coordination:
at low costs of forming links, individuals coordinate on the risk-dominant
action, while for high costs of forming links individuals coordinate on the
eﬃcient action. These results on the role of network evolution and the rela-
tionship between costs of forming links and social coordination appear to be
robust to a variety of modiﬁcations of the basic model.
6 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: The proof of part (a) follows directly from the
fact that c<fand is omitted. We provide a proof of part (b). In this
case f<c<b . We ﬁrst show that ai = aj = a,i fi,j belong to the
same component. Suppose not. If ¯ gij = 1, then it follows that the player
forming a link can proﬁtably deviate by deleting the link, since c>f. Similar
arguments apply if i and j are indirectly connected. We next show that if
i ∈ g  and j ∈ g  ,w h e r eg  and g   are two components in an equilibrium
network g,t h e nai  = aj.I fai = aj then the minimum payoﬀ to i from playing
the coordination game with j is b.S i n c e c<b ,p l a y e ri gains by forming
a link, i.e. choosing gij =1 . T h u sg is not an equilibrium network. The
ﬁnal step is to note that since there are only two actions in the coordination
game, there can be at most two distinct components. We note that the
completeness of each component follows from the assumption that c<b .
We next prove part (c). There are two subcases to consider: c>max{b,f} or
b<c<f .(Note, of course, that the former subcase is the only one possible if
b>f . ) Suppose ﬁrst that c>max{b,f},a n dl e tg be an equilibrium network
which is non-empty but also incomplete. From the above arguments in (b),
it follows that if ¯ gi,j =1 , then ai = aj = α.M o r e o v e r ,i faj = β, then player
j can have no links in the network. (These observations follow directly from
t h eh y p o t h e s i st h a tc>max{b,f}.) However, since g is assumed incomplete,
there must exist a pair of agents, i and j, such that gij = 0. First, suppose
29that ai = aj = α. Then, since c<d ,it is clearly proﬁtable for either of the
two players to deviate and form a link with the other player. Suppose next
that ai = aj = β. Then, players i and j can have no links and, furthermore,
since g is non-empty, there must be at least two other players k,l ∈ N such
that ak = al = α. But then player i can increase her payoﬀ by choosing
action α and linking to player k. Finally, consider the case where ai  = aj
and let player i choose β. Then, if this player deviates to action α and forms
a link with player j she increases her payoﬀ strictly. We have thus shown
that gij = 0 cannot be part of an equilibrium network. This proves that a
non-empty but incomplete network cannot be an equilibrium network in the
ﬁrst sub-case considered.
Consider now the case b<c<fand suppose, for the sake of contradiction,
that g is an equilibrium network which is non-empty but incomplete. Since
b<c<d , it follows directly that not every player chooses action α or
β. Moreover, in the mixed conﬁguration, all the players who choose α are
directly linked (since c<d ), there is a link between every pair of players who
choose dissimilar actions (since c<f), but there are no links between players
choosing β (since b<c ). But then it follows that every player choosing β can
increase her payoﬀ by switching to action α. This contradicts the hypothesis
that the mixed conﬁguration is an equilibrium. This completes the argument
for part (c).
Part (d) is immediate from the hypothesis that c>d .  
Proof of Proposition 2: We start proving Part (a). In view of Part (a)
of Proposition 1 and the fact that the underlying game is of a coordination
type, the inclusion Sα ∪Sβ ⊂ S∗ is obvious. To show the converse inclusion,
take any proﬁle s such that the sets A(s) ≡{ i ∈ N : ai = α} and B(s) ≡
{j ∈ N : aj = β} are both non-empty. We claim that such an s cannot be
an equilibrium.
Assume, for the sake of contradiction, that such a state s is a Nash equilib-
rium of the game and denote u ≡| A(s)|, 0 <u<n .Recall from Proposition
1 that every Nash network in this parameter range is complete. This implies
that for any player i ∈ A(s), we must have:
(u − 1)d +( n − u)e − ν(i;g) · c ≥ (u − 1)f +( n − u)b − ν(i;g) · c (11)
and for players j ∈ B(s):
(n − u − 1)b + uf − ν(j;g) · c ≥ (n − u − 1)e + ud − ν(j;g) · c. (12)
30It is easily veriﬁed that (11) and (12) are incompatible.
Now, we turn to Part (b). The inclusion Sα ∪ Sβ ⊂ S∗ is trivial. To show
that the inclusion S∗ ⊂ Sαβ holds strictly for large enough n, consider a
state s where both A(s)a n dB(s), deﬁned as above, are both non-empty and
complete components. Speciﬁcally, focus attention on those conﬁgurations
that are symmetric within each component, so that every player in A(s)
supports u−1
2 links and every player in B(s) supports n−u−1
2 links. (As before,
u stands for the cardinality of A(s) and we implicitly assume, for simplicity,
that u and n − u are odd numbers.) For this conﬁguration to be a Nash
equilibrium, we must have that the players in A(s) satisfy:






+ b(n − u) − c(n − u) (13)
where we use the fact that, in switching to action β, any player formerly
in A(s) will have to support herself all links to players in B(s) and will
no longer support any links to other players in A(s) – of course, she still
anticipate playing with those players from A(s) who support links with him.
On the other hand, the counterpart condition for players in B(s)i s :
(n − u − 1)b −
n − u − 1
2
c ≥ du + e
n − u − 1
2
− cu (14)
where, in this case, we rely on considerations for players in B(s)t h a ta r e
analogous to those explained before for players in A(s). Straightforward al-






2d − c − f
2b +2 d − 3c − f
+
2(b − c)
2b +2 d − 3c − f
(15)






c + e − 2b
2b +2 d − 3c − e
+
2b − c − e
2b +2 d − 3c − e
. (16)
We now check that, under the present parameter conditions:
2b − c − e
2b +2 d − 3c − e
>
2(b − c)
2b +2 d − 3c − f
. (17)















since c>f .The function ζ(z) ≡ z−e
z−f is uniformly decreasing in z since
b>f>e .Therefore, since Y< Z ,(19) obtains, which implies (18). Hence
it follows that, if n is large enough, one can ﬁnd suitable values of u such
that (15) and (16) jointly apply. This completes the proof of Part (b).
We now present the proof for part (c). We know from Proposition 1 that
the complete and the empty network are the only two possible equilibrium
networks. Since c>b>f>e , it is immediate that, in the complete network,
every player must choose α and this is a Nash equilibrium. Then note that,
for the empty network to be an equilibrium, it should be the case that no
player has an incentive to form a link. This implies that every player must
choose β. On the other hand, it is easy to see that the empty network with
everyone choosing β is a Nash equilibrium.
The proof of part (d) follows directly from the hypothesis c>max{d,b,f,e}.
 
Proof of Proposition 3: It is enough to show that, from any given state
s0, there is a ﬁnite chain of positive-probability events (bounded above zero,
since the number of states is ﬁnite) that lead to a rest point of the best
response dynamics.
Choose one of the two strategies, say β, and denote by B( 0 )t h es e to f
individuals adopting action β at s0. Order these individuals in some pre-
speciﬁed manner and starting with the ﬁrst one suppose that they are given
in turn the option to revise their choices (both concerning strategy and links).
If at any given stage τ, the player i in question does not want to change
strategies, we set B(τ +1 )=B(τ) and proceed to the next player if some
are still left. If none is left, the ﬁrst phase of the procedure stops. On the
other hand, if the player i considered at stage τ switches from β to α, then
we make B(τ +1 )=B(τ)\{i} and, at stage τ +1 , re-start the process with
the ﬁrst-ranked individual in B(τ +1 ) , i.e. not with the player following i.
Clearly, this ﬁrst phase of the procedure must eventually stop at some ﬁnite
τ1.
Then, consider the players choosing strategy α at τ1 and denote this set
by A(τ1) ≡ N\B(τ1). Proceed as above with a chain of unilateral revision
opportunities given to players adopting α in some pre-speciﬁed sequence,
32restarting the process when anyone switches from α to β. Again, the second
phase of the procedure ends at some ﬁnite τ2.
By construction, in this second phase, all strategy changes involve an increase
in the number of players adopting β, i.e. B(τ2) ⊇ B(τ1). Thus, if the network
links aﬀecting players in B(τ1) remain unchanged throughout, it is clear that
no player in this set would like to switch to α if given the opportunity at τ2+1.
However, in general, their network links will also evolve in this second phase,
because individual players in A(τ1) may form or delete links with players in
B(τ1). In principle, this could alter the situation of individual members of
B(τ1) and provide them with incentives to switch from β to α.I t c a n b e
shown, however, that this is not the case. To show it formally, consider any
given typical individual in B(τ1) and denote by ˆ rh,h= α,β, the number
of links received (but not supported) by this player from players choosing
action h. On the other hand, denote ˆ u ≡| A(τ1)|. Then, since the ﬁrst phase
of the procedure stops at τ1, one must have:
max
qα,qβ b(qβ +ˆ rβ)+f(qα +ˆ rα) − c(qα + qβ)
≥ max
qα,qβ e(qβ +ˆ rβ)+d(qα +ˆ rα) − c(qα + qβ)
(20)
for all qα,q β such that 0 ≤ qα ≤ ˆ u−ˆ rα, 0 ≤ qβ ≤ n−ˆ u−1−ˆ rβ. Now denote
by ˜ rh and ˜ u the counterpart of the previous magnitudes (ˆ rh and ˆ u) prevailing
at τ2. We now show that ˜ u ≤ ˆ u, ˜ rα ≤ ˆ rα,a n d˜ rβ ≥ ˆ rβ. First, we note that
˜ u ≤ ˆ u by construction of the process. Next note that if ˜ rα > ˆ rα then this
implies that some player who chooses action α has formed an additional link
with player i in the interval between τ1 and τ2. This is only possible if c<e .
It also implies that player i did not have a link with this player at τ1.T h i s
is only possible if c>f , a contradiction. Thus ˜ rα ≤ ˆ rα. Finally note that
˜ rβ ≥ ˆ rβ follows from the fact that the all the players choosing β at τ1 do not
revise their decisions in the interval between τ1 and τ2.
Therefore, (20) implies:
max
qα,qβ b(qβ +˜ rβ)+f(qα +˜ rα) − c(qα + qβ)
≥ max
qα,qβ e(qβ +˜ rβ)+d(qα +˜ rα) − c(qα + qβ)
for all qα,q β such that 0 ≤ qα ≤ ˜ u − ˜ rα, 0 ≤ qβ ≤ n − ˜ u − 1 − ˜ rβ. This
allows us to conclude that the concatenation of the two phases will lead the
process to a rest point of the best response dynamics, as desired.  
33Proof of Lemma 5: The proof is constructive. Let s ∈ Sh, h = α,β, and
order in some arbitrary fashion all other states in Sh\{s}. Also order in some
discretionary manner all pairs (i,j) ∈ P × P with i  = j. For the ﬁrst state
in Sh\{s}, say s1, proceed in the pre-speciﬁed sequence across pairs (i,j)
reversing the links of those of them whose links are diﬀerent from what they
are in s. This produces a well-deﬁned path joining s1 to s, whose constituent
states deﬁne a set denoted by Q1. Next, consider the highest ranked state in
Sh\Q1, say s2. Proceed as before, until state s2 is joined to either state s or a
state already included in Q1. Denote the states included in the corresponding
path by Q2. Clearly, when a stage n is reached such that Sh\(∪n
 =1Q )=∅,
the procedure described has fully constructed the desired s-tree restricted to
Sh.  
Proof of Lemma 6: Let sα and sβ be generic states in Sα and Sβ, respec-
tively. We want to determine the minimum number of mutations needed to
transit across a pair of them in either direction.
(1). First, consider a transition from sβ to sα and let k be the number of
mutations triggering it. If this transition is to take place via the best-response
dynamics after those many mutations, there must be some player currently
choosing β (i.e. who has not mutated) that may then voluntarily switch to
α. As before, denote by qh the number of active links this player supports to
players choosing h (h = α,β)a n dl e trh stand for the number of passive links
she receives from players choosing h (h = α,β). The payoﬀ from choosing α





β(e − c). (21)




α(f − c)+ˆ q
β(b − c), (22)
where ˆ qh and ˆ rh have the same interpretation of active and passive links as
before, now associated to the possibility that the player chooses β. Clearly,
we have qh =ˆ qh and rh =ˆ rh for each h = α,β. Concerning the passive links,
this is immediate; for active links, it follows from the fact that, since c<e ,
a player will want to create links to all unconnected players, independently
of what they do. Analogous considerations also ensure that (i). rα + qα = k
and (ii). rβ +qβ = n−k −1. Thus, in sum, for a transition from some state
34in Sβ to a state in Sα to be triggered, one must have:
πα − πβ =( r
α + q
α)(d − f) − (r
β + q
β)(b − e)
= k(d − f) − (n − k − 1)(b − e) ≥ 0
Let mβ,α stand for the minimum number of mutations which lead to such a




(d − f)+( b − e)
(n − 1), (23)
which gives us the minimum number of mutations that are necessary for a
transition from any state sβ to some sα. However, denoting by  z  the small-
est integer no smaller than z, suppose that the strategies of   b−e
(d−f)+(b−e)(n −
1)  players undergo a simultaneous mutation from any particular state sβ
(i.e. these players maintain their links but switch from β to α). Thereafter,
the repeated operation of the best-response dynamics is suﬃcient to induce a
transition to a state sα. Thus the necessary number of mutations computed
above is also suﬃcient to induce a transition from any sβ to some sα. That
is, the inequality in (23) holds with equality.
(2). Consider on the other hand, the transition sα to sβ. Using the expressions
(21) and (22), we can deduce that the minimum number of mutations mα,β




(d − f)+( b − e)
(n − 1). (24)
As in the ﬁrst case, this gives us the minimum number of mutations needed for
a transition. However, consider any state sα and suppose that the strategies
of  
d−f
(d−f)+(b−e)(n − 1)  players undergo a simultaneous mutation (i.e. they
maintain their links but switch from α to β). It again follows that the
operation of the best-response dynamics suﬃces to induce a transition to a
state sβ. That is, (24) holds with equality.
To conclude, simply note that, if n is large enough,

b − e






(d − f)+( b − e)
(n − 1)

since d − f<b− e.  
35Proof of Lemma 8 (Sketch): The proof proceeds in the same way as the
proof of Lemma 7. We therefore only spell out the main computations.
(1). First, consider transitions from state sβ to state sα and let k be the
number of mutations triggering it. We focus on a player currently choosing
β and aim at ﬁnding the most favorable (i.e. least mutation-costly) conditions
that would induce him to switch to α. Along the lines explained in the proof




(d − f)+( b − c)
(n − 1) ≡ H, (25)
which again can be seen to be tight in the sense that, in fact, mβ,α =  H  –
recall that  z  stands for the smallest integer no smaller than z.
(2). Analogous considerations for a transition from state sα to state sβ leads




(b − e)+( d − c)
(n − 1) ≡ H
 , (26)
which is also tight, i.e. mβ,α =  H  .
(3). Finally, to study how the sign of mβ,α − mα,β changes for large n as a
function of c, note that
H − H
  ≡ ∆(c)=
(b − c)(b − e) − (d − f)(d − c)
[(d − f)+( b − c)][(b − e)+( d − c)]
(n − 1). (27)
Observe that the denominator of ∆(c) is always positive, the numerator is
decreasing in c, and is moreover negative at c = b. This completes the proof.
 
Proof of Lemma 9: Fix some s ∈ Sαβ, with the players A(s)a n dB(s)o f
the α and β components displaying respective cardinalities |A(s)|≡u>0
and |B(s)|≡n−u>0, respectively. To address the ﬁrst part of the lemma,
suppose that a player i ∈ B(s) experiences a mutation, which has the eﬀect
of switching her action from β to α and the deletion of all her links with
players in B(s). Now consider the players in the set B(s)\{i}.T h e r ea r et w o
possibilities: either all of them wish to retain action β, or there is a player
w h ow i s h e st os w i t c ha c t i o n s .
36In the former case, let all of them move and they will retain their earlier
strategy except for one change: they will each delete their link with player
i,s i n c ef<c<b . We now get players in A(s) to move and they all form
a link with player i,s i n c ef<c<b<d .I tm a yb ec h e c k e dt h a tw eh a v e
reached an equilibrium state s ,w i t hA(s ) ≥ A(s)+1 .
Consider now the second possibility. Pick a player j ∈ B(s)\{i},w h ow i s h e s
to switch actions from β to α. It follows that this player will delete all
her links with players in B(s) and form links with all players in A(s) (since
e<f<c<b<d ). We then examine the incentives of the players still
choosing action β, i.e., players in the set B(s)\{i,j}. If there are no players
who would like to switch actions then we repeat step above and arrive at a
new state with a larger α-component. If there are players who wish to switch
actions from β to α then we get them to move one at a time. Eventually, we
arrive at either a new state s  ∈ Sαβ, or we arrive at a state s  ∈ Sα.
In either case, we have shown that starting from a state s ∈ Sαβ,w ec a nm o v e
with a single mutation to a state s  such that A(s ) ≥ A(s)+1. Since s ∈ Sαβ
was arbitrary, the proof is complete for the ﬁrst part. The second conclusion
concerning some new equilibrium state s   with | A(s  ) |≤| A(s) |− 1i s
analogous.  
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